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Abstract 
The switch to digital terrestrial television is now a global trend. In Latin America, where the 
terrestrial platform has a dominant role, the introduction of DTT raises important questions 
for economic and industrial development, as well as pluralism. This article focuses on the 
earliest experiences (Brazil, México and Argentina) and those of the newcomers (Chile, 
Colombia and Uruguay). The aim is to outline the differences between the various political 
decision processes and the way with which they have been turned into communication 
policies, so as to draw some conclusions that contribute to visualizing the future of television 
in the region.  
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Introduction 
Television in Latin America has predominantly followed the United States (US) 
commercial licensing model, financed by advertising and based on the granting of few high-
power licences to commercial operators in return for loosely (or politically) defined 
obligations. Therefore, public and not-for-profit broadcasters have always had a secondary 
role and the market has been controlled in each country by few companies, some of which 
nowadays are moreover part of multimedia groups and/or have connections with foreign 
capital.1 Both local politics and the globalization of media markets have been shaping the 
development of Latin American media since the nineties (Fox and Waisbord, 2002). 
In such a scenario, where the television industry has historically suffered from 
technological dependence, financial turbulence and a lack of (or limited) competition, the 
switch to digital television may prove to be either a unique opportunity to achieve important 
reforms or another chance to favour adaptation to existing industry arrangements over change. 
Since terrestrial television is one of the most important means of delivery of entertainment, 
penetration of satellite and cable is mostly relatively low and concentration and foreign 
ownership are not the exception to the rule (Mastrini and Becerra, 2001; 2004; 2009), the 
digital future of one of the few media services universally available is crucial. 
Most countries, generally speaking, are still laying the foundations for the complete 
switch to digital television. But the dominant role of the terrestrial platform and the economic 
and technical constrains the cable and satellite options present, in addition to the peculiar 
combination of political contexts, policy traditions and regulatory frameworks, are driving 
digital terrestrial television (DTT) towards the centre of switchover strategies. The numerous 
opportunities for economic and industrial development, as well as pluralism, that the amount 
of spectrum to be released and the necessity to upgrade equipment raise, have led most Latin 
American countries to adopt an explicit policy on the transition to digital television.  
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   These incentives explain the launch of trials and pilots in most countries of the region. 
Nevertheless these are still in embryonic condition in most countries, (CITEL, 2005, 2007; 
CNTV, 2006) with the exceptions of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, which represent the 
oldest experiences and have led the way for late starters, such as Chile, Colombia and 
Uruguay. This article focuses on the former as the most relevant case studies, among other 
reasons because of the size of their internal markets (the largest in the region) and their 
regional political influence. In addition, Mexico and Brazil lead the regional production of TV 
sets.  
   So, from pioneering decisions such as the Argentinean selection of ATSC, a decision 
later dropped but finally instead adopted by Mexico, to the Brazilians’ plans to encourage an 
independent development of a new standard, the objectives pursued in this article are mainly 
two: firstly, and from a general point of view, to outline the differences that exist within these 
political decision processes and the way that they have been turned into communication 
policies; secondly, to draw some conclusions that contribute to visualizing the future of the 
media with the highest penetration and impact in the region.  
   So as to achieve these objectives, case studies are described and analyzed taking a 
historical approach, organized in three periods, that allows to establish similarities and 
differences, conclude about potential lessons – also in the light of the experience of more 
developed countries – and offer a summary of opportunities and challenges that contribute to 
the design of policies that favour the democratization of the sector.  
 In the light of previous digital broadcasting and switchover policy research, that has 
tended to analyse national case studies (Frezza and Sorice, 2004; Brown and Picard, 2005; 
Cave and Nakamura, 2007; Starks, 2007; Fernández Alonso et al, 2008) and stress differences 
between countries (Galperin, 2004; García Leiva et al, 2006; García Leiva, 2008) and even 
international models (Bustamante, 2008) and regional blocks (García Leiva and Starks, 2009), 
 5
it is argued here that an analysis of the younger Latin American experiences can contribute to 
a better understanding of the transition to digital television across the world.  
 The aim of this piece is therefore to build upon the existing body of works about the 
region to offer a complementary broader and critical comparative picture (Hernández & 
Postolski, 2003; Galperin, 2003, 2007; Siqueira Bolaño & Cruz Brittos, 2003, 2007; Siqueira 
Bolaño & Rodrigues, 2004; Gómez, 2007; Kaplún, 2008; Cepeda, 2008). 
 
The nineties: an embryonic period 
 The countries here considered took their first steps towards DTT during the nineties. 
In Argentina the initiative to experiment with digital terrestrial transmissions came from the 
private sector (ATA), upon whose request in July 1997 through the Secretary of 
Communications (SeCom), the government created a committee to study the different 
standards and give advice about a transition strategy (Comisión de Estudio de Sistemas de 
Televisión Digital, later reorganized and renamed Comité Consultivo sobre Televisión 
Digital). The committee was ornamental since the tests were never conducted and president 
Menem decided, unilaterally and in absolute alignment with the US approach, to adopt ATSC 
in 1998, after freely allocating a second channel to the incumbent national operators for three 
years with which to experiment.  
   Rhetoric aside, two were the main reasons for this decision: the pressure placed by 
existing licensees to preserve their position and expand towards a new service, and the 
governmental interest in having an advantage in the digital television market over Brazil 
(Albornoz, Hernández and Postolski, 2000). Although the de la Rúa government did question 
the decision, it had more pressing priorities and the switchover policy was left behind. The 
2001 socioeconomic crisis gave place to a chaotic situation and the successive provisional 
administrations did not make any decision about the matter.  
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   So, until Mexico adopted the standard in 2004 and Honduras and El Salvador followed 
in 2007 and 20092, Argentina was one of the first countries in the world, together with Taiwan 
and South Korea, to choose ATSC, but without afterwards launching officially any platform. 
In Mexico, Televisa and Televisión Azteca began DTT trials with ATSC in 1999 and, until its 
official adoption, the Secretary of Communications and Transport (SCT) authorized three 
national channels to experiment with digital technology. The Brazilian positioning however 
was absolutely divergent.  
   In Brazil the initial pioneering interest in DTT came from the government, which in 
June 1991 created a commission to design a high definition television policy (COM-TV). 
Four years later, the main broadcast industry groups, SET and ABERT, created a joint 
technical committee to study the implementation of digital TV and evaluate the competing 
standards, objectives that would then be taken up by the newly created regulator ANATEL 
from 1998 on, substituting COM-TV. Undoubtedly, such rapid official support for the 
broadcasters’ interest can only be understood because of the country’s manufacturing industry 
potential. But another element that made the Brazilian experience different was the fact that, 
due to increasing participation of civil society, the whole process that was about to begin 
would be characterized by at least some degree of transparency and accountability unusual for 
the region (Siqueira Bolaño and Cruz Brittos, 2003). 
   The path of DTT in Chile has been tortuous. The advent of Ricardo Lagos to the 
Presidency in 2000 put on hold the existing plans that by the end of the nineties had already 
designed a legal and technical architecture to introduce the service through the Consejo 
Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) and Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones (Subtel). 
According to Hernández and Postolski (2003) the main reason for this was the lack of 
consensus between these agencies and the broadcasters (ANATEL), who were pro-ATSC. 
Moreover, even though Bachelet’s government finally boosted the process, some point out 
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that the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement signed in 2003 might have potential implications 
that should be taken into consideration (Bernier, 2004).  
   In any case, already in this preliminary phase some of the elements that would 
characterize DTT policies during the subsequent years in those countries with the most 
advanced experiences can be detected:  
 Constant moving backwards and forwards in the introduction of the service. 
Particularly as regards the question of standard selection, Chile and Peru are 
paradigmatic examples of official announcements followed by successive delays.  
 Hasty decision-making, significant in the case of Argentina, the consequence of none 
or little planning. 
 Dependency issues, in relation to media groups, as well as trade commitments. 
 And a lack of debate, only partially overcome in Brazil through public consultations 
and an increasing participation of civil society in communication issues. In the same 
direction, but with different outcomes, public hearings have also set important 
milestones in Chile and Colombia. 
 
The first lustrum of the new millennium: trials and drawbacks 
Around the turn of the century a second phase began, mainly due to the emergence of 
a debate that questioned the real consequences of migrating terrestrial networks, a new socio-
political context and some changes among the incumbent audiovisual operators. Whereas this 
resulted in Argentina in the abandonment, in practice, of ATSC, in Mexico the process that 
would adopt it was initiated, while Brazil supported the option of creating a completely new 
standard (of its own creation).  
   In Argentina, setting aside de la Rúa’s victory, stakeholders’ consensus around ATSC 
disappeared when Telefónica entered the television market and subsequently decided to 
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support DVB (Hernández and Postolski, 2003). After several years without important 
advances within the implementation field, digital television returned to the official agenda in 
September 2005. Kirchner government considered the possibility of adopting the same 
standard as Brazil, but afterwards confirmed that the decision would be independent.  
   In Mexico, the Comité Consultivo de Tecnologías Digitales para la Radiodifusión was 
established in 1999 as a government/industry group to define by 2002 the regulatory and 
technical framework for DTT implementation. Experimental transmissions took place in 
Mexico City and Tijuana, while the committee supported trials with every available standard. 
Nevertheless, its actions and recommendations were one-sided due to the lack of 
representatives of civil society in its composition.  
   In Brazil, to the surprise of many, the 1999/2000 tests came out in favour of the 
Japanese system, opening a broad debate that took place in many public consultations 
conducted by ANATEL. The complexity of the interests at stake placed them outside 
ANATEL’s mandate, which is why the Cardoso government decided to wait until making any 
decision. In fact, the President ignored the ideas of the professional sector (Federacão 
Nacional dos Jornalistas) and dismissed the Chinese offer to jointly build a fourth alternative 
international standard.  
   The outcome of the 2002 general elections, won by Lula, marked a major shift in the 
Brazilian digital strategy. Not only was the possibility of cooperating with China or India put 
back on the table, but the idea of creating a national standard from scratch was also supported. 
In short, a more strategic approach to transition was taken and digital television became a key 
tool for achieving other two goals: revitalizing the Brazilian consumer electronics industry 
and addressing the significant inequalities in access to advanced information and 
communication services among the population (Galperin, 2007).  
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   By mid-2003, the Chinese option was ruled out due to the fear of being swallowed by 
China’s huge market (Siqueira Bolaño and Rodrigues, 2004: 128) and in November the so-
called Brazilian Digital TV System (SBTVD) was launched by Decree Nº 4.901. Its aims 
were the promotion of research and development, the expansion of Brazilian technological 
industries and the planning of a gradual transition from analogue to digital television. 
   The government decided to support R&D centres working on the possibility of 
creating self-designed components that could form part of the SBTVD, distributing among 22 
research consortiums 30 million reales of the 80 million promised. Some kind of consensus 
was reached about the idea that the service should offer Internet access and have an 
interactive dimension.  
 
From 2005 on: time of definitions 
The formal adoption of the ATSC standard by the government of Mexico in July 2004 
inaugurated the current period, in which Latin American countries are finally making some 
decisions.  
 
The pioneers 
The Mexican decision, contained within a detailed policy document issued by the 
SCT,3 has not been a surprise and must be understood in the context of the NAFTA: the 
complete transition to digital television can constitute a unique opportunity for the domestic 
consumer electronic industry. At the same time, ATSC’s efforts were officially supported in a 
systematic way because it has always been crucial for the US and its global audiovisual 
industry to achieve a North American market (Canada had already adopted the standard in 
November 1997).  
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As Michael McEwen, Secretary General of the North America Broadcasters 
Association, put it: ‘We are set for an historic leap in North America, with a market of well 
over 400 million consumers, consumer DTV equipment will have the advantage of the 
economies of scale of a huge mass market. Likewise broadcasters and manufacturers will 
benefit from similar economies’.4  
   Following the example of its neighbour, Mexico allocated a second channel to 
incumbent operators to simulcast their analogue signals. The government approved a plan to 
extend digital terrestrial television by 2021, in six phases of three years each, but no precise 
date for the switch-off of analogue transmissions or the return of the analogue frequencies 
was established. At the end of the third period, all simulcasting stations will have to offer high 
or enhanced definition quality transmissions for at least 20% of their total broadcasting time. 
Interestingly, television stations might include the provision of telecommunication services. 
   This has led to a fierce battle between television and telecommunication operators. 
The so-called ‘Televisa Law’,5 passed in April 2006 and for the most part overturned by the 
Supreme Court the following year and a Convergence Agreement issued by the Presidency in 
October 2006 have formed the background for constant but difficult negotiations between 
Telmex and Televisa (as well as between these two and TV Azteca and the government). 
Whereas cable companies had been offering voice, data and video services since 2005, led by 
Televisa’s Cablevision, Telmex needed specific authorization to provide video services. The 
Agreement established the framework for the telecom and cable operators to enter each 
other’s markets offering triple-play services. 
   As regards implementation, DTT is improving slowly, with 36 channels on air in 2009 
and some high definition content, but with progressive pressure being placed on public 
service broadcasting: since planning obliges non-commercial stations to broadcast in areas 
with at least 1.5 million habitants from 1 October 2010 on, it seems they will have to face the 
 11
necessary upgrades with no additional funding or resources. The regulator has identified the 
following challenges: low digital receiver penetration, scarce knowledge of digital television’s 
advantages among the population and an absence of DTV rating evaluation.  
    In Brazil the appointment of communication minister Helio Costa put an end to plans 
to develop a separate and independent standard, ATSC was excluded for not being 
appropriate for mobile TV reception – a key requirement for the government – and, in the 
end, a fourth alternative consisting of a hybrid system specifically adapted for Brazilian 
requirements was chosen. This decision was made in spite of a visit by Viviane Reding, the 
European Union (EU) Commissioner for Information Society and complaints by SBTVD 
supporters. With Decree Nº 5.820, Lula established in June 2006 the Japanese ISDB-T system 
as the basis for the ‘new’ Brazilian standard called SBTD-T (Sistema Brasilerio de Televisao 
Digital Terrestre). 
   The final system was designed to be adapted to existing infrastructure, is based on 
MPEG-4, supports a Brazilian open middleware named Ginga and is of course capable of 
transmitting low bit rate video programmes to mobile handheld devices. This was a very 
important detail that made broadcasters push for the decision through Helio Costa, since it 
will allow them to deliver content without relying on telecommunication companies 
(Intervozes, 2006).  
   The decree also states that incumbent operators are to receive free-of-charge one 
additional frequency to simulcast their analogue channels and that the transition will take ten 
years to be completed throughout the whole country before the final switch-off of analogue 
TV. Japan’s promises were in the end decisive as well for a country whose local 
manufacturing capacity is critical: exemption from royalty payments, the possibility of 
building a new semiconductor factory in the country and joint funding for the transition from 
the existing TV standard PAL-M to SBTD-T. Whereas exemptions were granted and the 
 12
Japan Bank for International Cooperation provided in 2008 the first loan to finance the 
introduction of digital broadcasting in Brazil, no effective progress has been verified in the 
semiconductor manufacturing industry.6  
   The main reason that resulted in the selection of the SBTD-T might be summarized, 
according to Siqueira Bolaño and Cruz Brittos (2007: 95), as follows: the national system was 
supported by civil society (movements for the democratization of communications),7 while 
the Japanese standard by Red Globo and the European option was mainly of interest to 
Telefónica. The final decision clearly favoured broadcasters, because it will not only preserve 
the statu quo (there will be no new entrants to the market), but will also allow operators to 
expand towards the new niche of mobile broadcasting. 
    The Fórum do Sistema Brasileiro de TV Digital Terrestre8 was set up at the end of 
2006 as an association created to promote the adoption of DTT. Nevertheless, its take-up has 
been slow: even though transmissions started in December 2007 in Sao Paulo and coverage 
has improved as planned,9 by the end of 2008 only 200 thousand DTT boxes had been sold. 
Affordability has been an issue, as well as initial technical uncertainties. The service was 
launched without the existence of affordable receivers, including Ginga, in the market. By 
March 2010 coverage had reached 27 metropolitan areas; sales of receivers added up to two 
million by December 2009 (fixed, mobile, integrated and non-integrated options considered).  
   Last but not least, there is a chance that the introduction of DTT might boost public 
service broadcasting due to the fact that the creation of local public service channels was 
announced together with the launch of a common platform for federal public service stations 
with the aim of reducing costs and accelerating the deployment of the service.10   
 
Upcoming full launches 
It could be said that Uruguay and Colombia find themselves somewhere in between 
the first and second set of launching experiences described above. Despite the initial adoption 
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of DVB, a number of very important decisions must still be made, while crucial challenges lie 
ahead (coverage implementation, effective adoption…). 
   In Uruguay DTT was not really part of the public agenda until the arrival of Tabaré 
Vázquez to the presidency in 2005. Furthermore, the digitization of terrestrial networks was 
not even considered until Lula’s policies and decisions attracted the attention of politicians, 
businessmen and academia. More precisely, the adoption of the Japanese standard by Brazil 
accelerated the process for the creation in the beginning of 2007 the Comisión Nacional de 
Televisión Digital Terrestre, which chose for the European standard. The decree that formally 
adopted DVB-T and DVB-H was signed on 27 August 2007 by president Tabaré. 
   Nevertheless, this development was not accompanied by any decision about the 
regulatory framework or dates for transition, probably because these were the most 
controversial issues between the members of the Commission (Kaplun, 2008: 5). Definitions 
of such key aspects were then delayed and could not be seriously considered until 2010, as 
general elections took place in October 2009 and regulation prohibits the licensing of 
spectrum frequencies during such periods.  
   By 2009 it was expected that incumbent national operators – three commercial stations 
and the public service TNU – would receive an additional channel each and that, in 
compliance with the new Broadcasting Community Law (2007), five additional digital 
channels would be distributed among community media (three), TNU and a new commercial 
private operator. Existing analogue UHF broadcasters are simulcasting signals in trials, but 
there are still many economic and political uncertainties.  
   In Colombia, the Comisión Nacional de Televisión approved, in February 2006, a plan 
to implement DTT in the country. After conducting tests about the socioeconomic and 
technical impact of the change, that even included the Chinese DMB-T system, the adoption 
of DVB in August 2008 was decided upon by consensus (Comisión Nacional de Televisión, 
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2008). As in Uruguay and Panama,11 the resolution was influenced by the European offer of 
technological as well as financial cooperation. At the end of 2008, Impulsa TDT, the Spanish 
association for the implementation of DTT, and the Columbian government signed an official 
agreement under which Colombia has been receiving help to implement the service. 
   Soft launch was possible in September 2008 thanks to public service broadcasting and 
its official transmissions were set for May 2009. It was expected that throughout the first year 
25% of the population would gain access to the digital channels of existing national 
broadcasters. With a transition strategy designed to first affect the biggest cities and analogue 
switch-off set for 2020, the deployment of DTT has already begun. Commercial services were 
launched in Bogotá in January 2010.  
 
Successive delays and erratic processes  
Two groups can be identified within the rest of the countries that have begun more or 
less explicit processes to introduce DTT services. Firstly, the most recent Peruvian, 
Venezuelan and Bolivian experiences can be mentioned. In Bolivia as well as in Peru, the 
debate about the migration to digital television was not introduced until 2007 and trials took 
place in 2008. This is also the case of Venezuela whose peculiarity resides in the fact that 
ATSC was ruled out as an option for ideological reasons from the very beginning. Secondly, 
the contrasting older and more complex Argentinean and Chilean journeys will be outlined. 
In Peru a special commission to decide on the technical standard to be adopted was set 
up in February 2007, so that the Ministry of Transport and Communications could adopt an 
official position. Successive delays prevented this from happening until ISDB-T was 
recommended and chosen in April 2009, foreshadowing the Argentinean, Chilean, 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian decisions.12 Brazil had then become an additional and successful 
external actor lobbying for a particular standards choice. Jorge Cuba, the Peruvian minister, 
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announced a phased approach for the implementation of the standard (beginning in the 
provinces of Lima and Callao in 2010), as well as for the end of analogue transmissions (set 
between 2020 and 2030 for most of the country).  
   In Argentina Néstor Kirchner’s decision to ‘temporarily freeze’ in 2005 by means of 
Decree Nº 527 the ten-year period in which licences were to be granted to incumbent 
operators was supposed to be motivated by the need for certainty before facing the 
technological upgrade. In June 2006 a working group was created to advise the government 
on the standard which the nation should adopt, ATSC and DVB being the only options then 
considered. Nonetheless, by mid-2009 no official announcement had been made. 
Furthermore, President Fernández (Kirchner’s wife) allowed contradictory announcements 
throughout 2007 and 2008 that fluctuated from suggesting alignment with Brazil to 
forecasting the adoption of a common standard in association with Chile and Colombia.  
In the end, the Sistema Argentino de Television Digital Terrestre (SATVD-T), based 
in ISDB-T, was adopted in September 2009,13 while it was announced that first broadcastings 
would take place by mid-2010 and the whole transition period until the switch-off of the 
analogue signal would take place within a ten-year period. Even though many agree that the 
outcome of a coordinated definition with Brazil can certainly be positive, critics remind that 
the government has not yet defined the DTT model to be implemented. Evidently, Grupo 
Clarín’s interests in cable television, as well as Telefónica’s in double/triple-play offerings – 
apart from their connections with analogue terrestrial channels – have negatively influenced a 
balanced configuration of the audiovisual market and, as a consequence, a coherent 
introduction of digital terrestrial television services.  
   The Chilean experience has also been complicated. In May 2006, the Ministry of 
Transport and Telecommunications announced that before the end of the year the country 
would have had chosen a standard. But after three years, many public hearings, lots of 
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technical tests and some special official reports, Chile had yet to make a decision. Delays 
raised intense debates, which took place in parallel to the regulatory reform of the audiovisual 
sector (changes in rules affecting radio, television and public service broadcasting were 
approved). In November 2008, Bachelet’s government even presented a draft law to regulate 
the introduction of DTT services. But although this recognized the development of regional, 
local and community television, it was accused of being too generous towards incumbent 
operators.  
Finally, falling in line with Brazil, Peru and Argentina, Chile officially adopted ISDB-
T, citing better reception capabilities, given the characteristics of the country, as well as 
economic reasons (royalty exemptions and a converter around 40 pesos were decisive).14 
Before the 2010 earthquake, it was announced that the migration would cover a period of 
eight years, giving the population plenty of time to adapt.  
Finally, in the case of Venezuela, where a memorandum of understanding was signed 
with Japan in October 2009, it is expected that within 2010 a ten-year transition strategy will 
be outlined. The aim would be the promotion of e-government, e-education and e-health 
services through DTT.  
 
Ten years with DTT: similarities and differences 
What are then the lessons that might be deduced from the experiences described 
above? Before answering that question it is important to understand the main similarities and 
differences among them. In doing so, it can be said that Argentina and Brazil represent the 
most different early strategies that could have been adopted in the region. In the case of the 
former, the initial hurry that led to an authoritarian and conservative policy ended up in an 
uncertain situation without a transition plan or a solid standard decision until 2009. Brazil 
tried a totally independent R&D path full of public consultations, although finally opting for 
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the Japanese standard, modified with a Brazilian flavour, because of technical, financial as 
well as political reasons. 
   Although the country generated the most complex decision-making process in the 
region, it seems that in the end its DTT policy was influenced by those liberalizing measures 
introduced in the nineties. That is why, even though it can be said that there is room for hope, 
the fact is that the introduction of the service has not lowered the entrance barriers to the 
television market (Siqueria Bolaño and Cruz Brittos, 2007). 
   It remains an open question whether other Latin American countries will follow the 
Brazilian decision along with Peru, Argentina and Chile, while without this giant the once 
contemplated possibility of building a new regionally-shared standard was almost lost from 
the beginning. Mercosur’s mechanisms to reach consensus were not enough when faced with 
national interests.15 The remaining countries will surely have to limit their decisions to 
choosing between the Japanese/Brazilian, North American or European standard, as most of 
them are either too small or too poor to lead alternative strategies. 
    In relation to this, trade agreements (like the ones many signed with the US), foreign 
presence in media ownership and the structure of the existing broadcasting and consumer 
electronics industries will be key elements to take into consideration when analyzing the 
determining factors. These, together with the political orientation of those in power and the 
lobby of governments and organizations with a stake in each of the competing systems, go a 
long way towards explaining the different standards choices across the countries examined in 
this article. 
Mexico is a prime example due to the fact that its decision over ATSC implies a close 
commercial alignment with his neighbour, as well as being the ‘natural’ outcome if existing 
arrangements are to be preserved. Additionally, since Honduras and El Salvador have also 
chosen to adopt ATSC technology, Mexico’s strategy may have set the pattern for much of 
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Central America. If so, US efforts to lobby for ATSC, which were concentrated mainly on 
pushing for a continentally-shared standard through CITEL, the Inter-American 
Telecommunication Commission of the Organization of American States, might end up 
influencing half of the continent.  
The European strategy, coordinated by the EU’s Information Society and Media 
Directorate-General, was meant to support DVB through bilateral cooperation agreements, 
focused on financial support to help fund digital switchover activities, and benefited from the 
special role played by the Spanish demonstrations, particularly in the Colombian and 
Uruguayan cases. Nevertheless, it is pretty clear by now that the Brazilian decision, the 
consequence of a complex combination of Japanese concessions, pressure from broadcasters 
and a relatively autonomous industrial policy, is the one currently succeeding in leading South 
American developments.  
In relation to this, further political analysis is necessary to explain whether the 
Argentinean, Chilean, Peruvian and Venezuelan choices arose from the desire to build a 
regional approach to the transition of digital television, were agreed upon because of 
ideological affinities, or simply display a shared desire to express independence from the US 
and EU in this instance. 
To summarize, it can be said that Latin America has had to face the transition to DTT 
in a global context where the development and diffusion of standards was already in place. 
Nevertheless, what would have been expected from a technological and even an industrial 
point of view, that is to say, making digital decisions in accordance with technical aspects and 
analogue infrastructures, was in fact challenged and overcome by politics. It is obviously hard 
to tell up to what extent each of the mentioned variables influenced the selection of standards, 
but, interestingly, neither purely market-based nor completely politically-driven choices were 
made.  
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Through the alternation between competition and cooperation among and within 
stakeholders, governments and standard-setting alliances, on the national as well as regional 
level and due to the combination of different doses of negotiation, hybrid selection processes 
emerged. The outcome of different standards choices can only be explained by a complex 
combination of internal and external forces, as well as political, financial and techno-
industrial motivations that crystallized into mixed market and institutional approaches.  
These tendencies have also of course been conditioning the policy formation processes 
around other aspects linked to the digitization of terrestrial television, still barely discussed 
beyond the experiences already launched and in place (Mexico and Brazil). Little is known, 
for example, about spectrum management (digital dividend issues, spectrum allocation and 
refarming), DTT models (architecture, extent of enhanced programming, business models), 
and transition strategies (cost-effective alternatives, policy levers).  
Nonetheless, what has been clear up to now is that the main trade-offs involved in the 
national decisions were basically focused on which standard to support and when to intervene. 
Argentina was the only country to pick a standard at a very early stage, since most waited to 
learn how interstandard rivalry developed. During this approximately five-year process 
Mexico chose ATSC and Brazil decided to support a standard-setting process that encouraged 
intersystem and interstandard competition. When the administration of President Lula finally 
made up its mind, the rest were forced to choose as well. In other words, once Mexico and 
Brazil were established as dominant players, the bandwagon gathered momentum.  
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Table 1: DTT in Latin America – Main markets and most advanced experiences 
 
  Brazil Mexico Argentina Chile Colombia Uruguay 
 
General data*  
Inhabitants 
(000) 
 
184.300 
 
105.100 
 
37.900 
 
16.400 
 
46.600 
 
3.300 
TV hhs/ total 
hhs 
 
98% 
 
96% 
 
98% 
 
96,7% 
 
93,7% 
 
96% 
TV sets/ 
1.000 hab. 
 
265 
 
333 
 
422 
 
361 
 
321 
 
400 
Dominant 
platform(s) 
Terrestrial Terrestrial (cable 
44%) 
Terrestrial Terrestrial  
(48,8%) and cable (42,9%) 
Terrestrial 
3,222 2,861 1,503 ND DTV 
households 
(000) Rest of region: 425,88 / Latin total: 12,174 
 
DTT  
Multiplex 
bandwidth  
6 MHz 
ISDB/SBTVD ATSC ISDB/SATVD ISDB DVB Standard 
adoption 06/2006 07/2004 09/2009 08/2008 08/2007 
Launch  12/2007 San 
Paulo; 07/2008 
Rio de Janeiro 
(pilot 1999) 2004 Soft launch 2010 Soft launch 05/2009 Trials since 
09/2007 
Analogue 
switch-off 
30/06/2016 31/12/2021 No hard date decided yet 01/2020 Not decided yet 
Support for 
interactivity, 
interoperability 
and mobility; 
MPEG4  
Standard & high 
definition mix 
(MPEG2)  
Reception quality, high definition, 
interactivity and increase in the 
number/variety of channels (MPEG4) 
Emphasis on increasing the number of channels 
(MPEG2) 
 
Technical 
aspects 
privileged  
DTT considered as a substitute of universal analogue terrestrial television → major role in switchover strategy 
 
DTT model  Free-to-air Free-to-air 
(future pay services?) 
Free-to-air 
Public service  Simulcast + 
additional 
frequencies 
Simulcast, but under 
financial pressure  
 
 
  
Unclear Simulcast; apparently leading role 
Allocation will 
specially 
consider 
community/pub
lic media 
*Source: Informa Telecoms & Media (Sourcebook, 2007; Americas TV 13th Edition, 2009), Fundación Telefónica (Anuario 2006) and regulators. 
 
 So, even though official interest in DTT was born a decade ago, it is still difficult to 
point out similarities and differences. Nonetheless, the strategies to introduce the service share 
– from a general point of view and beyond national specificities – the following elements: 
 The introduction of DTT services is being made in direct relation with the complete 
migration to digital broadcasting. As a consequence, no country has launched digital 
terrestrial television without considering universal access issues and adopting an analogue 
switch-off timetable.  
 In a context where pay-TV services have a low penetration, free-to-air options prevail. 
 The decisions made by the pioneering countries were motivated by the condition of 
major markets in terms of size and influence (Mexico, Argentina and Brazil; TV receiver 
manufacturing is an important industry in both Mexico and Brazil). 
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 Therefore, technological and industrial development and economic advantages, rather 
than the promotion of social inclusion and cultural diversity, were the motives for the 
introduction of digital terrestrial television.  
 That is why Siqueira Bolaño and Cruz Brittos’ conclusion about the Brazilian example 
(2007) might be applicable to the rest of the most advanced experiences: DTT models under 
construction do not present real and in-depth changes in important matters, such as pluralism 
or social participation, that could lead to social inclusion. The digitization of universal and 
‘free’ terrestrial television has until now only accelerated existing inequalities.  
 This explains the fact that public service broadcasting, already marginal and weak in 
most countries, is not being considered for taking on a leading role.  
 Finally, it is interesting to point out the existence of public debates through 
consultations and hearings and the formation of commissions/study groups, despite their 
heterogeneous means and scopes. The path initiated by Chile and Colombia is encouraging. In 
Brazil, civil society has been organized to defend the democratization of communications, 
while the government even made a self-development attempt supporting research around a 
Brazilian standard. By contrast, the Mexican and Argentinean committees were mere 
masquerades.  
   The fact that all decisions about the introduction of DTT are being taken in parallel to 
crucial regulatory debates about the future of communications (laws and rules being under 
revision) is also a relevant element to point out. 
 
Lessons from divergent approaches 
Therefore, as regards the lessons which the introduction of DTT in Latin America has 
provided, the following stand out. To begin with, it must be said that the predominantly 
supported DTT models clearly draw from free-to-air options and traditions and at the same 
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time tend to preserve existing audiovisual arrangements. It is evident that analogue 
architectures are determining factors that influence policy options.  
Nevertheless, the outcome is far from clear since, generally speaking, the main 
alternatives seem to be:  
 Support for high definition alternatives, though partially and with expensive migration 
costs for the complete value chain (Mexico). 
 Trust in the introduction of interactive value-added services as drivers for 
consumption and free-pay business models (Brazilian plans). 
 Or emphasis on the increase of the number of channels, multiplying the standard 
definition offering (Uruguay, Colombia), with the risk of putting too much future pressure on 
business models basically dependent on advertising (small or even turbulent markets).  
Secondly, it emerges as evident that where consensus is not stable and the introduction 
of DTT services is decided unilaterally – by political motives or through purely market-driven 
approaches – and without every stakeholder’s involvement, tendency to disruption is higher, 
leading to delays and periods of uncertainty. Similarly, official decisions and announcements 
with little or no connection with market conditions and consumer needs tend to fail. This is 
the case with analogue switch-off dates set politically, aggressive migration plans or even 
naive policies. 
 Thirdly, due to supranational logics embodied in regional policies and trade 
agreements, different public policy traditions and styles or financial limitations, public 
intervention is only shyly or non-explicitly displayed (in which case the reason is usually 
partisan interference). The problem is that this state of affairs makes it more difficult to break 
the typical vicious cycle that has negatively influenced the introduction of the service in other 
parts of the world.  
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 From the relatively successful experiences of those countries that started upon the 
digital switchover journey earlier (United Kingdom, France, Italy), it has been learned that 
consumers need to be offered a good quality free-to-view option with receivers available at 
affordable prices in the open market as key elements to gain rapid take-up and pursue 
equalitarian access. 
 Additionally, the need for cooperation is significant. The region suffers from a 
historical lack of a coordinated approach to the audiovisual sector. Therefore, there has not 
been up to now a common position towards the digitization of terrestrial networks. Any 
original intention of full-scale harmonization efforts for the region vanished as each country 
started adopting its own policies. In other words, while Latin America has its own regional 
trade agreements (Mercosur, Andean Community, CARICOM), decision-making processes 
have to date remained with the individual nations. 
 Finally, international pressure from governments and agencies with a stake in the three 
main digital TV standards has also played a role. However, fierce lobbying has increasingly 
and interestingly had to face ‘flirting’ processes during the last few years. Many South 
American countries have realized that even though they might not be able to support an 
independent development of a separate standard they can negotiate at least some benefits (free 
technical support, exemptions from royalty payments, financial aid, etc.) 
 
Lessons from the developed world? 
Following Starks (2007), who contemplates digital switchover strategies in countries 
that launched DTT around the turn of the century, the question raised in this article is whether 
learning points that help reduce risks and foster success can be identified for Latin America. 
Useful lessons gathered from the experience of more developed nations would include the 
following (Spectrum and Value Partners, 2007; García Leiva and Starks, 2009).  
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 Digital frequencies need to be allocated to incumbent operators to facilitate the 
transition to DTT (though not necessarily exclusively). Where additional capacity exists 
frequencies have been awarded mainly through ‘beauty contests’, with the exception of public 
service broadcasting, and spectrum has been reserved for local and regional channels. In most 
cases, licensing, usually for 10/15 years, makes distinctions between authorisations for 
transmission service providers (networks), multiplex operators and content providers 
(stations).  
As has already been mentioned, a solid free-to-air option, accompanied by affordable 
receivers in the open market, is behind the highest penetrations. And in countries where pay-
DTT services exist, the requirement of sharing common access technology is central to 
ensuring that receivers can support different competitive pay-TV channels. 
More specifically, where terrestrial reception is dominant, the transition does not have 
to rely solely on digital terrestrial transmissions, since other platforms might contribute more 
cost-effectively to offering universal services. Whereas all countries have set a hard date for 
the switch-off of analogue signals, transition periods vary widely, as do approaches to 
switchover (national scale, region-by-region, by ‘islands’).  
Subsidies can certainly play a role, especially in the closing stage of mandatory 
switchover and with helping vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or the unemployed. They 
can be introduced for the supply and/or the demand side. Nevertheless, in any case, 
switchover cannot be implemented without high public awareness. Consequently, campaigns 
must be in place well in advance. 
Finally, smooth and close cooperation between the main stakeholders has proven 
essential. That is why many countries have suggested or facilitated the creation of 
consortiums/associations to support the introduction of the service (e.g. Digital UK, Impulsa 
TDT, DGTVi).  
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      In other words, ‘no country has attempted to achieve an entirely “hands-off” digital 
switchover process. Government and regulators have accordingly been involved in a range of 
interventions: from cajoling, facilitating industry bodies, formalising standard-setting, 
licensing new spectrum allocations, planning the practicalities of switchover and protecting 
the interests of the consumer. Where there is a major national public service broadcaster, it 
has generally taken a central role, though this role varies’ (García Leiva et al, 2006: 44). 
 
To conclude: opportunities and challenges 
Due to the fact that it might be too soon to deduce conclusive tendencies and define 
the DTT models that will emerge in Latin America, an approach that takes into consideration 
the negative and positive characteristics which the case studies are providing could for the 
moment be more useful. That is why the aim is to point out the most evident challenges and 
opportunities through the six dimensions mentioned below, with the intention of clarifying the 
possibilities that DTT could enable.  
 Discourse 
    Apart from the fact that, generally speaking, promises and ideal models for what DTT 
should bring about are currently facing a complicated translation into reality, priorities and 
goals established in official programmes and reports show the discursive dominance of 
economic-industrial logics and the side-stepping of social, cultural and educative concerns. 
Danger lies, therefore, in the sole consideration of criteria such as spectrum efficiency or the 
pursuit of new business opportunities for the audiovisual sector, while objectives like 
diversity and quality of contents or pluralism are left behind.  
 Regulators and regulation 
   In a region where during the last few years decisive though intence debates about the 
future and regulation of communications have been taking place, the creation or development 
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of independent and transparent regulatory agencies has still to materialize. At the same time, 
the difficulties with forming coherent and integral legal frameworks constitute an important 
threat as well. In both cases, at least two variables are currently significantly influencing the 
outcome: the juridical and geographical nature of regulation and regulators. In other words, 
national and public dimensions are nowadays insufficient to explain complex interactions and 
multiple relationships, because frontiers are blurred (national/local, global/regional blocs, 
public/private).  
 Offering  
   If DTT is considered to be the perfect substitute for universal analogue terrestrial 
networks, the advantages it presents might as well be dilemmas. Depending on the model to 
be promoted, existing architectures with better quality pictures might be preserved or, to the 
contrary, challenged, resulting in potential repercussions for funding options, implicated 
stakeholders and reception alternatives. There are obviously no pre-designed customizable 
solutions but, beyond the selection of technical standards, the opportunity to forge a more 
consistent regional approach is still possible as regards audiovisual cooperation through 
exchange, coproduction and distribution.  
 Stakeholders  
   DTT could certainly help reconfigure the audiovisual sector democratizing existing 
ownership structures, hand in hand with civil society, public service broadcasting and local 
level authorities, as a non-negotiable starting point for the promotion of competition and 
pluralism. Such a development would certainly have to challenge the statu quo and the role 
played by new agents (gatekeepers such as EPG and CAS providers or multiplex operators), 
not necessarily belonging to the traditional audiovisual world (receiver industry, network 
operators) and sometimes historically ‘foreign’ to it (telecommunication operators). 
 Geographical levels/markets 
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   Regional blocks and international logics permanently influence the national level, 
which is why markets cannot be considered any more without taking this element into 
consideration. It is essential to understand that DTT in Latin America is affected on the one 
hand by its own audiovisual history and national policies and, on the other hand, by 
agreements reached within and between regional blocks (Mercosur, Andean Community, 
CARICOM, NAFTA; EU), as well as on the global level (WTO, ITU). The consideration of 
the region as one of the fields where the global battle over standards has been taking place is 
an overwhelming geopolitical example.  
 Audiences  
   Finally, as regards the status audiences can acquire, it is important to point out the 
possibility that the client might gain priority over the citizen if DTT is understood as another 
possibility for audiovisual consumption instead of (or in addition to) a new opportunity for 
participation. Efforts should be directed not only at promoting the representation and presence 
of citizens in broadcasting activities, but also in the policy debates and decision-making 
processes. In this sense, some of the experiences described are, at least, encouraging.  
   To conclude, it must be said that the biggest challenge DTT posses in a region where 
terrestrial television is the most important means of delivery of information and entertainment 
has to do with building balanced public policies that are up to the expectations of the 
audiovisual sector, while also taking citizens’ rights into consideration. In doing so, the 
challenges mentioned could be turned into a unique opportunity: strengthening universal and 
democratic access to audiovisual services in the digital era.  
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Endnotes  
                                                 
1 Examples would include Canal 13 and Telefé in Argentina, Televisa and TV Azteca 
in Mexico and the virtual monopoly of Red O’Globo in Brazil, imperfect due to the presence 
of SBT, Record and Bandeirantes. 
2 Honduras adopted the ATSC standard on January 2007 thanks to a decision made by 
the Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones. El Salvador adopted it in April 2009, based 
on a technical report issued by the Telecommunications Bureau of SIGET (which in turn 
relied on recommendations issued by the Central American Regional Technical Commission 
of Telecommunications). 
3 Acuerdo por el que se Adopta el Estándar Tecnológico de Televisión Digital 
Terrestre y se Establece la Política para la Transición a la Televisión Digital Terrestre. 
Retrieved from http://dgsrt.sct.gob.mx/fileadmin/TDT/Pol_tica_de_la_TDT_01.pdf 
(February, 2009). 
4 ATSC press release, ‘Mexico adopts the ATSC DTV standard’, (07/07/04). Retrieved 
from http://www.atsc.org/communications/press/ (February, 2009). 
5 Modifications to the Telecommunications Law and Radio and Television Law were 
passed by Congress in the midst of presidential election campaigns. 
6 Japan agreed to support those companies willing to invest in the Brazilian 
semiconductor industry, which is why a joint working group has been established, but few 
advances have been registered. Toshiba might lead the way through the collaboration that is 
taking place with CEITIC in microelectronics design and production.   
7 It should be noted that these movements were mainly gathered around the FNDC 
(Forum for the Democratization of Communication) (http://www.fndc.org.br). 
8 http://www.forumsbtvd.org.br. 
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9 http://www.forumsbtvd.org.br/materias.asp?id=55; 
http://www.teleco.com.br/tvdigital_cronog.asp. 
10 Regulation was approved in February 2009 to specify the access to such a platform 
(a national digital communication public network) that would be comprised of at least six 
stations: TV Brasil, TV Senado, TV Cãmara, TV Justiça and the new Canal de Cidadania and 
Canal da Educação (Norma Geral para Execução dos Serviços de Televisão Pública Digital 
Nº 01/2009).  
11 Panama also adopted DVB-T in May 2009 and free-to-air services were launched by 
the public service broadcaster SERTV by the end of that year. 
12 Resolución  Suprema Nº 019-2009-MTC, de 23 de abril de 2009, por la que se 
adopta  el estándar de televisión digital terrestre para el Perú. Details available at 
http://www.mtc.gob.pe/portal/tdt/tdt.html (September, 2009). By the end of March 2010 
Ecuador also announced the ISDB-T/SBTVD would be chosen. The rest of the countries that 
are in the process of evaluating systems are Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Dominican Republic.  
13 Decreto 1148/09, de 31 de agosto de 2009, por el que se crea el Sistema Argentino 
de Televisión Digital Terrestre. 
14 Decreto Supremo N° 136 de 2009. Details in 
http://www.subtel.cl/prontus_tvd/site/edic/base/port/inicio.html  (September, 2009). 
15 Something similar happened with the introduction of colour TV, which created 
fragmented markets: whereas Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay opted for a unique standard 
that was an adaptation of the European PAL system to the 6 MHz channel scheme established 
by the ITU for the region (PAL-N), most other countries chose the American NTSC (already 
designed for 6 MHz) and Brazil created yet another PAL adaptation (PAL-M). 
